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SHAREHOLDER BYLAWS AND THE DELAWARE 
CORPORATION
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER*
Much like hostile tender offers in the 1980s and 1990s, shareholder bylaws 
purporting to limit board authority in key areas of corporate governance are, once 
again, forcing Delaware’s courts to grapple with the fundamental nature of the 
corporate form.  Who ultimately calls the shots in corporate governance?  And for 
whose benefit?  The shareholders’ statutory authority to enact bylaws has become a 
pivotal issue in the on-going battle for corporate governance supremacy. 
In its 2008 opinion in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,1 the 
Delaware Supreme Court began to define the nature and scope of the shareholders’ 
bylaw authority.  No doubt to activist shareholders’ delight, the court held that a 
proposed bylaw requiring reimbursement of shareholders’ proxy expenses under 
specified circumstances was “a proper subject for shareholder action” under the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).  This victory was essentially pyrrhic, 
however, because the court went on to hold that such a mandatory bylaw would 
nevertheless violate Delaware common law by forcing the board to breach its 
fiduciary duties if it concluded that reimbursement would not promote the 
company’s interests.2
Commentators have criticized the court’s fiduciary duty-based analysis as 
excessively vague and indeterminate.  I argue here that the court’s reliance on 
fiduciary duties in this context reflects not a failed attempt at clarity so much as a 
decided effort to maintain ambiguity.  Just like in hostile takeover cases, which 
forced the court to address the scope of the shareholders’ unilateral power to sell the 
company, one cannot meaningfully analyze the scope of the shareholders’ unilateral 
power to write the rules of corporate governance without defining the nature and 
purpose of the corporation itself.  However, given the lack of statutory guidance on 
the core questions of corporate power and purpose, Delaware judges have 
consistently – and understandably – remained reluctant to grapple with these issues 
in a clear and decisive way. 
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1 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
2 See infra part II. 
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As in the takeover context, the court has fallen back on a fiduciary duty-
based analysis precisely because it permits evasion of what is truly at stake.  Through 
such analysis, the court has avoided the policy issue of who should possess a given 
form of power by transforming it into the doctrinal issue of whether the board’s 
fiduciary duties permit that power to be exercised by shareholders.  Absent legislative 
intervention, we can expect a bylaw jurisprudence exhibiting a theoretical obscurity 
and hands-off posture reminiscent of Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence – a trend 
already evidenced by the holding in CA, Inc.3
I. THE SHAREHOLDERS’ BYLAW AUTHORITY
Beyond the power to elect and remove directors, bylaw authority represents 
essentially the only statutory mechanism through which shareholders can bring their 
will to bear on the governance of a Delaware corporation.4  DGCL § 109 provides 
that “the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders 
entitled to vote,” and that “bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with 
law or with the [charter], relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of 
its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.”5  This statute would appear to confer substantial 
authority upon the shareholders.  However, two elements of the statute substantially 
qualify it.  First, concurrent bylaw authority may be, and typically is, given to the 
board through the company’s charter,6 raising the complex issue of whether 
shareholder bylaws may be amended or repealed later by the board.  Second, bylaws 
cannot be “inconsistent with law,”7 raising the issue of the extent to which 
shareholders can utilize their power over bylaws to constrain the board’s own 
statutory governance authority.  Indeed, board authority under DGCL § 141(a) is 
similarly sweeping:  “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its [charter].”8
3 See infra part III.
4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 141(k) (2009).  Shareholders can also dissolve the corporation 
unilaterally, but only by unanimous written consent.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c) (2009). 
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a)-(b) (2009). 
6 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).  See also DAVID A. DREXLER, LEWIS S. BLACK, JR. & A.
GILCHRIST SPARKS, III, DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.02 (2008); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 409, 470 (1998).
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009). 
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It is widely recognized that these statutes provide no meaningful guidance 
regarding how these grants of authority relate to each other.9  In fact, they appear to 
create a circularity that Jeffrey Gordon has termed the “recursive loop” – under § 
109 bylaws cannot be “inconsistent with law,” including § 141; however, under § 141 
the board’s authority is limited as “provided in this chapter,” which includes § 109.10
Not surprisingly, scholars have advanced sharply conflicting views on the interaction 
of these provisions.  Lawrence Hamermesh has argued that no limits on board 
authority should be permitted through bylaws except where a provision other than § 
109 explicitly envisions it.11  Others, however, have observed that this reading 
renders the expansive language of § 109 pointless.12  Perhaps the most influential 
effort to reconcile these provisions has been offered by John Coffee, who argues that 
shareholder bylaws are more likely to pass muster if they relate to “fundamental” 
matters (as opposed to “ordinary” matters), “negative” constraints on action (as 
opposed to “affirmative” instructions), “procedural” matters (as opposed to 
“substantive” business decisions), and matters of general “governance” (as opposed 
to specific matters).13  Coffee’s approach has garnered both adherents and 
detractors.14
Meanwhile, the stakes grow ever higher as activist shareholders continue to 
advance bylaw proposals that implicate core governance matters such as takeover 
defenses, proxy access, and board elections.15  This, once again, raises the issue of 
who ultimately controls the corporation.  In 2006, Lucian Bebchuk, as a shareholder 
of CA, Inc., sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of a proposed bylaw that 
required adoption or extension of a poison pill to be approved either by shareholders 
9 See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385,
1423-24, 1444-47 (2008); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of 
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 606-08 (1997); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” 
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 511, 544-47 (1997); Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 651, 659-60 (2008); Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the 
Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 319-20 (2001).
10 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 546-47. 
11 See Hamermesh, supra note 6, at 430-44. 
12 See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 205, 213-15 (2005); Thompson & Smith, supra note 9, at 321. 
13 See Coffee, supra note 9, at 613-15. 
14 Compare McDonnell, supra note 9, at 660-61 (endorsing Coffee’s latter two factors), with
Hamermesh, supra note6, at 432-44 (rejecting Coffee’s factors as “fail[ing] to afford either 
predictability or even compelling logic.”). 
15 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 9, at 651-52. 
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or by unanimous vote of the board on an annual basis.16  Although Vice Chancellor 
Lamb indicated that such a bylaw could potentially be found valid,17 he ultimately 
refused to provide declaratory relief on ripeness grounds, leaving the question 
unanswered.18
Due to the unsettled state of Delaware law, “federal law has been the realm 
within which most of the debate has taken place,” as boards and shareholders have 
sought to persuade the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that various 
proposed bylaws could or could not be excluded from public company proxy 
statements under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.19  Such guidance has inevitably 
been limited, however, by the fact that the pertinent bases for exclusion hinge on 
state law – notably whether the proposed bylaw is “a proper subject for action by 
shareholders” in the jurisdiction of incorporation and whether the bylaw “would, if 
implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which 
it is subject.”20
II. THE EMERGING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan reflects the confluence of these 
state and federal dynamics.  In June 2008 the SEC, taking advantage of a recent 
amendment to the Delaware Constitution, certified to the Delaware Supreme Court 
two questions regarding a proposed bylaw that AFSCME sought to include in CA, 
Inc.’s proxy statement.21  The proposed bylaw would have required the board to 
reimburse proxy expenses of shareholders nominating a short slate of board 
candidates where certain requirements were met.22  The SEC wanted to know 
whether the bylaw would run afoul of the Rule 14a-8 exclusions cited above, which 
turned on (1) whether it was “a proper subject for action by [Delaware] 
16 See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738-39 (Del. Ch. 2006).  Amendment or repeal would 
likewise require unanimous board approval.  Id.
17 See id. at 742-43.  See also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws (June 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928674 (providing Bebchuk’s brief from the case). 
18 See Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 740-42.  The bylaw ultimately failed, receiving 41 percent of the vote.  See
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 624 (2d ed. 2007). 
19 See Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder’s Role, Defining a Role for State Law: Folk at 40, 33
DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 778-82 (2008). 
20 See 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(2) (2009). 
21 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008). 
22 Id. at 229-30. 
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shareholders,” and (2) whether it would otherwise cause the company to violate 
Delaware law.23
The court’s “proper subject” analysis focused on whether unilateral 
enactment of such a bylaw would “facially violate any provision of the DGCL,”24
which brought the court to the recursive loop.  Justice Jacobs resolved this issue in 
the board’s favor, reasoning that because the board’s management authority is “a 
cardinal precept of the DGCL,” § 141’s exception could not be construed as 
including § 109.25  Consequently, the issue became whether the proposed bylaw 
would be “inconsistent with law” under § 109 itself, which Justice Jacobs clarified 
would include § 141’s grant of board authority.26  He rejected CA’s argument, 
however, that board authority may not be limited through bylaws, recognizing that 
this would gut § 109 of any significance.27  Noting that §§ 109 and 141 are “only 
marginally helpful” in ascertaining the scope of the shareholders’ bylaw authority, 
Justice Jacobs declined to adopt a single “bright line,” but did effectively endorse one 
of the factors advocated by Coffee – the distinction between “procedures” and 
“specific substantive business decisions.”28  In this light, the “context and purpose” 
of the bylaw – facilitating shareholder participation in the board nomination process 
– supported the conclusion that the bylaw was indeed a proper subject for 
shareholder action.29
The analysis of whether the bylaw would otherwise violate Delaware law, 
however, focused on common law.  The court ultimately found that such a 
mandatory bylaw would force the board to breach its fiduciary duties if the board 
concluded that reimbursement of proxy expenses was not consistent with the 
company’s interests.30  Citing to cases involving board action that hindered the 
board’s own ability to discharge its fiduciary duties (“no-shop” provisions and 
“delayed redemption” poison pills), Justice Jacobs rejected AFSCME’s argument that 
a shareholder-imposed constraint is a different matter.31  AFSCME took the view 
“that it is unfair to claim that the Bylaw prevents the CA board from discharging its 
fiduciary duty where the effect of the Bylaw is to relieve the board entirely of those 
23 Id. at 229-31. 
24 Id. at 231, 238. 
25 Id. at 232 n.7. 
26 Id.
27 Id. at 234. 
28 Id. at 234-36. 
29 Id. at 235-37. 
30 Id. at 238. 
31 Id. at 238-39. 
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duties in this specific area.”32  Characterizing this argument as “more semantical than 
substantive,” Justice Jacobs insisted that AFSCME’s bylaw “mandates 
reimbursement of election expenses in circumstances that a proper application of 
fiduciary principles could preclude.”33  Those believing that such a shareholder bylaw 
should be permissible were urged to pursue a charter amendment, requiring board 
approval, or to “seek recourse from the Delaware General Assembly.”34
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE PURPOSE IN THE BYLAW DEBATE
The procedure/substance distinction applied in the court’s “proper subject” 
analysis has been relatively uncontroversial.35  However, the application of fiduciary 
duties to assess whether the bylaw would otherwise violate Delaware law has given 
rise to sharp disagreement.  Naturally, those favoring less shareholder action herald 
this approach, while those favoring more disparage it.36  Virtually all seem to agree, 
however, that such bylaw proposals implicate core questions of corporate law and 
theory,37 and it is through this lens that the court’s fiduciary duty-based approach 
comes into focus.
As Brett McDonnell observes, the court’s rejection of AFSCME’s argument 
as “more semantical than substantive” is itself less than compelling, 38 though 
perhaps not for the reason that McDonnell suggests.  McDonnell endorses 
AFSCME’s argument on the logic that “where the beneficiaries of [the board’s 
fiduciary] duty, the shareholders, have decided to limit the board’s discretion because 
they do not trust the board on a particular matter, the need for a fiduciary duty 
limitation on the board ceases.”39  This conclusion reflects McDonnell’s acceptance 
of economically-oriented arguments favoring shareholder power.  Such arguments 
emphasize the value of experimentation through default governance rules and 
32 Id. at 239. 
33 Id. at 239-40. 
34 Id. at 240.  See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2009) (requiring board approval of charter 
amendments). 
35 See Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the Fiduciaries?: An Analysis 
of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 750-58 (2008); McDonnell, supra note 
9, at 661-63. 
36 Compare Alexander & Honaker, supra note 35, at 764-66 (endorsing this approach) with McDonnell, 
supra note 9, at 664-69 (criticizing it as “unclear and ominous” for shareholders). 
37 See, e.g., Alexander & Honaker, supra note 35, at 769; Gordon, supra note 9, at 547; Thompson & 
Smith, supra note 9, at 319-20. 
38 McDonnell, supra note 9, at 669. 
39 Id.
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minimization of agency costs.40  This leads McDonnell to assume that the 
shareholders can be treated as the singular beneficiaries of the board’s fiduciary 
duties.  This is not fully consistent with Delaware case law, however, which has long 
described fiduciary duties as being owed simultaneously to both “the corporation 
and its stockholders.”41  This is precisely why the CA, Inc. court framed the issue of 
the proposed bylaw’s legality by referring to the board’s fiduciary duties. 
I have argued elsewhere that Delaware corporate law is deeply ambivalent 
regarding the corporate governance role of shareholders, due principally to 
misgivings regarding the consistency of their interests and incentives with those of 
the larger public.42  This dynamic figures most prominently in the hostile takeover 
context, where shareholder interests directly conflict with those of other 
stakeholders, but shareholder bylaws are fundamentally similar in that they implicate 
the defining issues of corporate law.43  In both contexts, shareholders deploy a 
generally accepted right (selling stock, enacting bylaws) in an arguably novel and 
creative manner with the purpose and effect of challenging the board’s governance 
authority.  In both types of cases, courts directly confront the core issue of corporate 
power, which necessarily implicates corporate purpose – that is, the aims and 
intended beneficiaries of corporate activity.44
In each instance, then, we find the court evading these defining issues by the 
same means – reliance on an ambivalent formulation of fiduciary duties.  In 
takeovers, the core issue of who should control whether a hostile tender offer 
succeeds is reframed as whether the board’s fiduciary duties permit such a decision 
to be made by the shareholders themselves (or narrowly in their interests).45  In CA, 
40 Id. at 654-57. 
41 See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., 
Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) (reiterating this formulation). 
42 See Bruner, supra note 9, at 1449 (“Corporate law’s ambivalence regarding power constituencies, 
regarding beneficiaries, and regarding the achievement of the social good, each reflect larger 
misgivings about the consistency of shareholders’ interests and incentives with those of society at 
large.”); Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431952 (contrasting this ambivalence with 
the stark shareholder-centrism of U.K. corporate governance and arguing that the degree of 
shareholder orientation in each system reflects the degree of stakeholder protection provided outside 
corporate governance). 
43 See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 9, at 1408-32. 
44 See generally Gordon, supra note 9 (discussing the effects of shareholder bylaws and takeover 
defenses on “the distribution of power between shareholders and the board of directors”); Lyman 
Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865
(1990) (discussing how hostile takeovers have forced courts to confront issues of corporate purpose). 
45 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (1990) (characterizing 
“selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals” as an element of fiduciary duty that 
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Inc. the court repeats this maneuver in the bylaw context.  The core issue of who 
should control whether shareholder proxy expenses are reimbursed is reframed as 
whether the board’s fiduciary duties permit such a decision to be made by the 
shareholders themselves (or narrowly in their interests).46  In each case, the 
distinction is subtle but important – policy is restyled as doctrine, obscuring the 
fundamental nature of the issue, and preservation of board power is restyled as non-
abdication of a broadly phrased preexisting duty.47
It is telling that the CA, Inc. court more than once observes the lack of 
legislative action to clarify what the scope of the shareholders’ bylaw authority ought 
to be.48  This too resembles the takeover context, where the Delaware legislature has 
remained conspicuously absent while the courts have labored to delineate the scope 
of the shareholders’ capacity to accept hostile tender offers.49  I suggest that, if left to 
the courts, we can expect a Delaware bylaw jurisprudence exhibiting a theoretical 
obscurity strongly reminiscent of that characterizing its takeover jurisprudence,50 an 
outcome reflecting the fact that Delaware’s judges have again been placed in the 
awkward position of answering the core policy questions of corporate law.51  Federal 
pressure may, to be sure, force the Delaware legislature to address various bylaw-
related issues in a piecemeal fashion.52  In the meantime, CA, Inc. shows the 
Delaware Supreme Court to be well along a familiar path. 
“may not be delegated to the stockholders”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 
(1985) (permitting boards to consider “‘constituencies’ other than shareholders” in assessing 
proportionality of defensive measures). 
46 See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 239-40 (Del. 2008). 
47 Cf. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on 
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2002) (observing the tendency “to write 
judicial opinions in a way that obscures policy choices,” including in Delaware’s takeover 
jurisprudence). 
48 See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234-35, 240. 
49 See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 47, at 1068 (describing this “legislative vacuum”). 
50 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9, at 515 (describing Delaware takeover opinions as “delphic”); 
Johnson, supra note 44, at 902 (arguing that Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence aims to “harmonize 
management discretion with shareholder primacy while, in fact, sweeping the whole thing under the 
rug”). 
51 See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 44, at 1067-71. 
52 See generally Thompson, supra note 19.  J. Robert Brown speculates that the new DGCL § 112 
permitting proxy access bylaws represents an attempt “to cut off the anticipated federal right.”  See J. 
Robert Brown, The SEC, Access and the Need to Preempt Delaware Law, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/ preemption-of-delaware-law/the-sec-access-and-the-need-to-
preempt-delaware-law.html; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009); Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (proposed June 10, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate 
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Directors (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm.  The new 
§ 113 similarly permits proxy expense reimbursement bylaws, though its list of potential “procedures 
or conditions” makes no mention of the board’s fiduciary duties.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 
(2009).  Practitioners express uncertainty as to whether this statutory provision “overrides” the court’s 
holding in CA, Inc. that Delaware law requires board discretion to deny reimbursement.  See Sullivan 
& Cromwell LLP, Corporate Governance of Delaware Corporations:  Delaware Adopts Amendments to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law Relating to Corporate Governance, at 4, Apr. 28, 2009, 
http://www.sullcrom.com (follow “Site Map” hyperlink; then follow “Publications” hyperlink; then 
type “Corporate Governance of Delaware” in search box).  See also Eric S. Wilensky & Angela L. 
Priest, Corporate Governance Developments in a Recessionary Environment, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 921 
(May 18, 2009) (observing that as “an opt-in statute,” the board could repeal a § 113 shareholder 
bylaw). 
